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Abstract
When rms are heterogeneous, there may not exist a common collusive price that
raises all rmsprots. However it is shown that there always exists a common mini-
mum price that raises all rmsprots.
1 Introduction
In practice, one of the primary challenges faced by rms desiring to collude is that they are
often highly asymmetric. Firms can have di¤erent products and costs and this manifests
itself in terms of di¤erent prices and quantities under competition. The stability of collusion
then depends on nding a collusive outcome (and a strategy) such that all of these asym-
metric rms nd it incentive compatible to adhere to it. At a minimum, each rms prot
under collusion must exceed that which it earned when rms were competing. If rms can
coordinate on any price vector then this latter condition is not a problem as there will always
exist a collection of prices that makes all rms better o¤.
The problem that arises in practice is that agreeing to and coordinating on a di¤erent
price for each rm will probably require extensive communication among rms which en-
hances the possibility that they will be discovered and convicted for engaging in unlawful
collusion. An alternative is for rms to coordinate in a simpler manner that would require
far less communication and coordination. One well-documented approach is price leadership
whereby a rm takes the role of price leader, selects a price, and then all rms match that
This research has been conducted with the nancial support of the National Science Foundation (SES-
1148129).
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price. While that will surely lead to higher prots for all rms when rms are similar in cost
and demand, that is not true when rms are su¢ ciently di¤erent. For example, suppose rms
have di¤erent prices and market shares under competition because their products appeal to
di¤erent market segments and, in addition, some rms have relatively elastic rm demand
(which is why they set relatively low prices). If all rms were to set the same price then
those rms with more elastic demand would realize a large drop in sales and thus could be
worse o¤ than under competition. Or suppose rms have di¤erent costs. If rms coordinate
on a price above the highest competitive price then the lowest-cost (and lowest-priced) rms
may not nd it protable because their market share has signicantly declined; and if they
coordinate on a price below the highest competitive price (but above the lowest competitive
price) then the highest-cost (and highest-priced) rms may not nd it protable because
their margins are too small. For example, Goto and Iizuka (2014) examined an attempt by
medical care providers to coordinate on the price charged for the u vaccine and found that,
at every common price, some rms would be earning lower prots than under competition.
A number of trade associations have pursued a di¤erent simple strategy to promote
collusion among their members. Firms are asked to abide by a minimum price; that is, all
rms charge a price at least as high as some minimum level and are otherwise unconstrained.
The U.S. Department of Justice pursued a case against the Association of Retail Agents for
"organizing a boycott of their members against airlines, hotels, and car rental companies
who refused to adhere to ARTAs recommended minimum travel commission levels."1 The
U.S. Federal Trade Commission brought a case against North Texas Specialty Physicians
where, among other anti-competitive activities, it had encouraged members to reject fees
below some minimum level.2 The Competition Commission of Singapore pursued a case
against 16 bus operators and their trade association for colluding on the price of bus services
from Singapore to Malaysia and Southern Thailand. One of the infringements was that the
Express Bus Agencies Association announced a minimum selling price.3 Finally, returning to
the u vaccine case mentioned above, the medical association that orchestrated the collusion
actually did so by putting forth a minimum recommended price of $38.
The contribution of this paper is to show that, regardless of the extent of rm hetero-
geneity, there is always a minimum price that will make all rms better o¤. Consider a
minimum price that lies between the lowest and the highest competitive prices. By causing
the lowest-priced rms to raise their prices to this minimum, it is immediate that all of the
higher-priced rms are better o¤. What is less clear is whether the lowest-priced rms are
better o¤ from having raised their prices. We show there always exists a minimum price
such that all rms, including the lowest-priced rms, are better o¤. Thus, an appropriately
chosen minimum price can result in supracompetitive prices that are sustainable.
1Anne K. Bingaman, "Recent Enforcement Actions by the Antitrust Division Against Trade Associa-
tions," 32nd Annual Symposium of the Trade Association and Antitrust Law Committee of the Bar Associ-
ation of the District of Columbia, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, April 25, 1996.
2North Texas Specialty Physicians v. Federal Trade Commission, No. 06-60023, 2008 WL 2043040 (5th
Cir., May 14, 2008)
3"The Honeymoon is Over: CCS Fines 16 Coach Operators and their Trade Associa-
tion SGD1.69 Million for Price Fixing," Ai Ai Wong and Ken Chia, Baker & McKenzie,
www.bakermckenzie.com/RRSingaporeHoneymoonIsOver (downloaded 11/19/14)
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2 Model
Consider n  2 rms choosing prices where (p1; :::; pn) is the price vector and rm is prot
function is i (p1; :::; pn), i = 1; :::; n:
A1 i (p1; :::; pn) :

p; p
n ! [0;1) is a bounded, twice continuously di¤erentiable function.
A2 For all (p1; :::; pi 1; pi+1; :::; pn) 2

p; p
n 1
; @i (p1; :::; pi 1; p; pi+1; :::; pn) =@pi < 0:
A3 @i (p1; :::; pn) =@pj > 0 for all j 6= i:
A4 @2i (p1; :::; pn) =@pi@pj > 0 for all j 6= i
A rms prot is increasing in other rmsprices (A3) and prices are strategic complements
(A4).
By these assumptions, there exists a non-decreasing best reply function i (p i) ; where
p i  (p1; :::; pi 1; pi+1; :::; pn) ;
i (p i) = argmax
pi
i (p1; :::; pn) :
By A2, the upper bound on price is not a binding constraint in which case i (p i) < p:
By Theorem 4 of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) (hereafter referred to as MR90), these
assumptions are su¢ cient to ensure the existence of a Nash equilibrium which we denote:
epi  p = i  ep1  p ; :::; epi 1  p ; epi+1  p epn  p ; for all i = 1; :::; n:
(For purposes of the later analysis, the dependence of equilibrium prices on the minimum
price to a rms choice set is made explicit.) There may be multiple equilibria. As shown in
MR90, there exists a smallest and largest equilibrium where the order is  component-wise.
In the ensuing analysis, it is presumed that there is a unique equilibrium or, when there are
multiple equilibria, there is a selection of either the smallest or largest.
When p = 0, so rms are not constrained to set a minimum price (only that prices are
non-negative), the selected equilibrium price vector is denoted:
(p1; :::; p

n) = (ep1 (0) ; :::; epn (0)) :
(p1; :::; p

n) should be thought of as the non-collusive price vector; that is, the prices that
would emerge if rms did not collude.
Thus far, assumptions do not ensure that there is an equilibrium in which all rms have
positive demand. One approach at this point would be to impose more structure; for example,
assume symmetric demand functions and constant marginal cost that is not too high and
does not di¤er too much across rms. In the spirit of generality, it is instead assumed there
is an interior equilibrium and it is heterogeneous.
A5 pi 2 (0; p) and i  i (p1; :::; pn) > 0; i = 1; :::; n:
A6 There exists m 2 f1; :::; n  1g such that p1 =    = pm < pm+1      pn:
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3 Result
Now consider the innitely repeated game with perfect monitoring for which the stage game
is the game described in Section 2. As motivated in the Introduction, I will consider collusion
in terms of rms required to set price at or above some agreed-upon minimum level, which
is denoted p. As long as all rms have always priced at least as high as p, each rm will
continue to abide by the convention of pricing at or above p. If any rm prices below p,
collusion ends and there is a return to static Nash equilibrium prices.4 More formally, the
strategy is
pti =
 epi  p if pj  p for all   t  1; for all j
pi otherwise.
t = 1; 2; :::; i = 1; :::; n
Given that other rms future prices are the same as long as rm i prices at least as
high as p; optimality (along the equilibrium path) requires that rm i choose the price
that maximizes current prot subject to pricing at least as high as p. Given that must be
true for all rms, it follow from the analysis of Section 2 that equilibrium requires rm i
to price at epi  p. If rmsdiscount factors are su¢ ciently close to one then this strategy
prole is a subgame perfect equilibrium as long as the collusive prot exceeds the static Nash
equilibrium prot:
i
 ep1  p ; :::; epn  p > i ; for all i = 1; :::; n:
We now prove that there exists a minimum price whereby that is the case.
Theorem 1 There exists p > p1 such that i
 ep1  p ; :::; epn  p > i ; for all i = 1; :::; n:
Proof. The proof has three steps. First, it is shown that, for a game among only rms
m+ 1; :::; n, Nash equilibrium prices are increasing in the prices of rms 1; :::;m. Second, it
is shown that if p 2  p1; pm+1 then the equilibrium prices of rms m + 1; :::; n are strictly
higher compared to p = 0. Third, it is shown that if p is su¢ ciently close to p1 then prots
are strictly higher for rms 1; :::;m.
As an initial step, dene Nash equilibrium for the game among rms m + 1; :::; n when
p = 0 and they take as given prices for rms 1; :::;m. For that game, bpi (p1; :::; pm) denotes
a Nash equilibrium price:
bpi (p1; :::; pm) = i (p1; :::; pm; bpm+1 (p1; :::; pm) ; :::; bpn (p1; :::; pm)) ; i = m+ 1; :::; n:
By Theorem 4 of MR90, a Nash equilibrium exists. Again, any statement with regards to
this equilibrium refers to the smallest or largest and the selection is assumed to be the same
selection as with (p1; :::; p

n). Note thatbpi (p1; :::; pm) = pi ; i = m+ 1; :::; n:
By Theorem 6 of MR90, bpi (p1; :::; pm) is non-decreasing in pj, j = 1; :::;m. In using
Theorem 6 for the game among rms m + 1; :::; n, we are treating (p1; :::; pm) as exogenous
4The particular form of punishment is unimportant for the analysis.
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variables which, by our assumptions, satisfy A50 in MR90. Furthermore, if bpi (p1; :::; pm) 2 
p; p

then bpi (p1; :::; pm) is increasing in (p1; :::; pm), as I now show. If bpi (p1; :::; pm) 2  p; p
then it satises:
@i (p1; :::; pm; bpm+1 (p1; :::; pm) ; :::; bpn (p1; :::; pm))
@pi
= 0:
If p00  (p001; :::; p00m)  (p01; :::; p0m)  p0 with strict inequality for at least one component then
it follows from @2i (p1; :::; pn) =@pi@pj > 0 that
@i (p
00; bpm+1 (p00) ; :::; bpi 1 (p00) ; bpi (p0) ; bpi+1 (p00) ; :::; bpn (p00))
@pi
>
@i (p
0; bpm+1 (p0) ; :::; bpn (p0))
@pi
= 0:
That is, given rms 1; :::;m are pricing higher at p00 and rm j = m + 1; :::; n (except
rm i) is pricing weakly higher at bpj (p00) , rm is prot is increasing in its price when
evaluated at its original equilibrium price bpi (p0). Hence, bpi (p00) > bpi (p0) ; and this holds for
all i = m+ 1; :::; n.
Consider a minimum price that is greater than the lowest equilibrium price and less than
the next-to-lowest equilibrium price: p1 < p < p

m+1. Given that epj  p  p by assumption
then p > pj implies epj  p > pj ; j = 1; :::;m: Next note that, given rm j (= 1; :::;m) prices
higher at epj  p ; the equilibrium price for rm i (= m + 1; :::; n) in the game among rms
m+ 1; :::; n exceeds the original equilibrium price:
bpi  ep1  p ; :::; epm  p > pi ; i = m+ 1; :::; n:
This is true because bpi (p1; :::; pm) is increasing in (p1; :::; pm),  ep1  p ; :::; epm  p > (p1; :::; pm) ;
and bpi (p1; :::; pm) = pi : We then havebpi  ep1  p ; :::; epm  p > pi > p; i = m+ 1; :::; n
and, therefore, bpi  ep1  p ; :::; epm  p > p. Given that these n m rms are not constrained
by the minimum price p, it follows that
epi  p = bpi  ep1  p ; :::; epm  p ; i = m+ 1; :::; n:
Recall that bpi (p1; :::; pm) is the equilibrium price in the game among rms m+1; :::; n when
p = 0.
In sum, at the minimum price p 2  p1; pm+1, epi  p  p > pi (i = 1; :::;m) andepi  p > pi (i = m + 1; :::; n). First note that rms m + 1; :::; n are earning strictly higher
prot:
i
 ep1  p ; :::; epn  p > i ; i = m+ 1; :::; n: (1)
Given all rival rms are pricing higher - epj  p > pj for all j 6= i - and rm is prot is
increasing in rival rmsprices, rm is prot is strictly higher at its original equilibrium
price:
i
 ep1  p ; :::; epi 1  p ; pi ; epi+1  p ; :::; epn  p > i ;
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which implies its prot is higher at the new equilibrium price as stated in (1).
I then just need to derive su¢ cient conditions for the prots of rms 1; :::;m to be higher.
We will show that if p = p1 + " then
i
 ep1  p ; :::; epn  p > i ; i = 1; :::;m
for " > 0 and su¢ ciently small. Wlog, consider rm 1. Given the other rmsnew prices,
rm 1s equilibrium prot has a lower bound associated with it pricing at p = p1 + " :
1 (ep1 (p1 + ") ; :::; epn (p1 + "))  1 (p1 + "; ep2 (p1 + ") ; :::; epn (p1 + ")) : (2)
Given epi (p1 + ")  p1+ "(= p) for i = 2; :::;m and rm 1s prot is increasing in rival rms
prices, it follows that
1 (p

1 + "; ep2 (p1 + ") ; :::; epn (p1 + ")) (3)
 1 (p1 + "; :::; p1 + "; epm+1 (p1 + ") ; :::; epn (p1 + ")) :
Since epi  p ; i = m+1; :::; n, has been shown to be strictly increasing in p for p 2  p1; pm+1 ;
there exists a di¤erentiable, strictly increasing function  i (p

1 + ") 2 [pi ; epi (p1 + ")] which
acts as a lower bound on epi  p. (Note that we are not assured that epi  p is di¤erentiable
everywhere.) Given rm 1s prot is increasing in rival rmsprices, it follows that:
1 (p

1 + "; :::; p

1 + "; epm+1 (p1 + ") ; :::; epn (p1 + ")) (4)
 1
 
p1 + "; :::; p

1 + ";  m+1 (p

1 + ") ; :::;  n (p

1 + ")

:
Combining (2)-(4):
1 (ep1 (p1 + ") ; :::; epn (p1 + "))  1  p1 + "; :::; p1 + ";  m+1 (p1 + ") ; :::;  n (p1 + ") ;
so the RHS is a lower bound on rm 1s equilibrium prot when the minimum price is p1+".
It is then su¢ cient to prove that this lower bound exceeds the original equilibrium prot:
1
 
p1 + "; :::; p

1 + ";  m+1 (p

1 + ") ; :::;  n (p

1 + ")

> 1: (5)
Take the derivative of the LHS of (5) with respect to "
d1
 
p1 + "; :::; p

1 + ";  m+1 (p

1 + ") ; :::;  n (p

1 + ")

d"
=
@1
 
p1 + "; :::; p

1 + ";  m+1 (p

1 + ") ; :::;  n (p

1 + ")

@p1
+
mX
i=2
@1
 
p1 + "; :::; p

1 + ";  m+1 (p

1 + ") ; :::;  n (p

1 + ")

@pi
+
nX
i=m+1
@1
 
p1 + "; :::; p

1 + ";  m+1 (p

1 + ") ; :::;  n (p

1 + ")

@pi
@ i (p

1 + ")
@"
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Evaluate at " = 0 :
d1
 
p1; :::; p

m;  m+1 (p

1) ; :::;  n (p

1)

d"
=
d1 (p

1; :::; p

n)
d"
=
@1 (p

1; :::; p

n)
@p1
+
mX
i=2
@1 (p

1; :::; p

n)
@pi
+
nX
i=m+1
@1 (p

1; :::; p

n)
@pi
@ i (p

1)
@"
=
mX
i=2
@1 (p

1; :::; p

n)
@pi
+
nX
i=m+1
@1 (p

1; :::; p

n)
@pi
@ i (p

1)
@"
> 0
because
@1(p1;:::;pn)
@p1
= 0 and
@1(p1;:::;pn)
@pi
> 0: It then follows that 9"0 > 0 such that (5) is
true 8" 2 (0; "0) :
A minimum price that only binds for the lowest-priced rms is clearly benecial to the
other rms because their lower-priced rivals have raised their prices. The problematic issue
is whether the lowest-priced rms are better o¤. Holding xed their rival rmsprices, that
is not necessarily the case (and clearly is not the case whenm = 1) because the lowest-priced
rms are pricing above their best reply functions. Of course, the rival rms are not holding
their prices xed but instead are raising their prices because the lowest-priced rms have
raised their prices. This rise in rivalsprices enhances the prots of those rms which raised
their prices to the minimum level.
E¤ectively, the minimum price requirement is causing the lowest-priced rms to act like
Stackelberg leaders. They raise price to satisfy the required minimum and the other rms
respond by raising their prices. The latter is a rst-order positive e¤ect on the prots of the
lowest-priced rms while the former is a second-order negative e¤ect; hence, the lowest-priced
rms earn higher prot.
In conclusion, regardless of the heterogeneity of rms, there always exists a minimum
price such that if rms price optimally subject to that minimum price constraint then all
rmsprots are higher compared to competition. If rms are su¢ ciently patient, they can
then collude using the convention that all rmsprices respect some minimum level.
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